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NONPROFITS AND POLITICS
INTRODUCTION
Before a charity can save the world, enlighten the masses, or pro-
mote spiritual harmony, it first must make a deal with the devil and
file for tax exemption under § 501(c) (3) of the tax code.' As the
boon of this Faustian bargain, a charitable, organization gains in-
creased access to charitable contributions. Tax exemption facilitates
this access in two ways. First, tax exemption represents a powerful
affirmation of the organization's mandate. Knowing that the IRS
monitors tax-exempt charities and that it will impose serious sanctions
for a charity's misdeeds assures contributors of a charity's legitimacy.
In this way, § 501(c) (3)'s stamp of approval increases the likelihood
that a contributor will make a donation by relieving him of fears that
the charity will divert his contribution from its intended purpose.2
Thus, for many potential philanthropists, tax-exempt status provides
an important means of distinguishing the Salvation Armies and Red
Crosses of the world from the hard-luck panhandlers and self-serving
Santa Clauses.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, tax exemption provides
individuals with incentives to make donations to charitable organiza-
tions. Tax-exempt status under § 501(c) (3) not only frees the charita-
ble organization itself from taxes on the contributions it receives, but
also makes it possible for the organization's benefactors to deduct the
amount of the contribution on their individual income tax returns.3
1 I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) (1994). Section 501(c) (3) extends tax exemption to the follow-
ing organizations:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for pub-
lic safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or interna-
tional amateur sports competition .... or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to
influence legislation .... and which does not participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political cam-
paign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
Id.
2 Professor Hansmann attributes this dynamic to the "nondistribution constraint" im-
posed upon nonprofit organizations. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,
89 YALE L.J. 835, 847 (1980). Because contributors to a charity are in a "poor position" to
monitor whether the funds actually reach the intended recipient, a for-profit organization
would have an incentive "to divert most or all of its revenues directly to its owners." Id.
Nonprofit organizations, however, are prevented by law from distributing the contributed
funds to the owners of the organization. As a result, nonprofit organizations lack the in-
centive to divert funds and can provide the contributor with an assurance that the organi-
zation will use the funds in the intended manner. In short, a contributor to a charity
'needs an organization that he can trust, and the nonprofit, because of the legal con-
straints under which it must operate, is likely to serve that function better than its for-profit
counterpart." Id.
3 SeeI.R.C. § 170(c)(D)(2).
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As a result, a contributor to a tax-exempt charity enjoys both the good
feelings attendant with supporting the charitable cause of his choice
and a government subsidy of sorts in the form of lower taxes.
To realize the benefits of this deal with the IRS, however, the
charity must sacrifice its "soul" by agreeing to restrict the range of
activities it will undertake. Section 501 (c) (3) imposes just such a re-
striction by prohibiting tax-exempt organizations from engaging in
political campaign activities.4 Thus, to receive tax-exempt status, char-
itable organizations must relinquish the right to comment on candi-
dates, even though the election of a particular candidate might
dramatically aid or hinder that organization's ability to accomplish its
exempt purposes. In this way, § 501(c) (3)'s prohibition of political
campaign activity effectively silences a charity at a time when it feels
most compelled to speak, when its speech might be the most effective
in furthering its mission, and when the public debate surrounding is-
sues of concern to it becomes most intense. In essence, § 501 (c) (3)
forces a charity to sacrifice part of its vision and its institutional char-
acter to ensure its operational success.
As a practical matter, most charitable organizations must accept
this Faustian bargain. Many charities depend heavily upon donations
to fund their operations5 and simply could not survive without the
competitive advantages that tax exemption under § 501 (c) (3) affords
them. At the same time, however, charities desire to minimize the
compromising effect that § 501(c) (3) has on their core beliefs and to
remain as politically active as possible without losing their tax-exempt
status. With their vision, ideals, and important First Amendment
rights at stake, charitable organizations seek a clearly defined limit to
§ 501 (c) (3) 's prohibition. What constitutes political campaign activity
under § 501 (c) (3), and how far can charities go without losing their
tax-exempt status?
Unfortunately, courts and the IRS have not provided much of an
answer.6 In fact, they have compounded the uncertainty by defining
4 See id. § 501(c) (3).
5 See, e.g., BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF FUND-RAISING 1 (2d ed. 1996) ("[M]ost
[charitable organizations] must engage in the solicitation of contributions to continue
their work .... ."); Hansmann, supra note 2, at 846 (noting that one particular nonprofit
charity, CARE, "obtains much of its funding from personal contributions").
6 One leading commentator describes § 501(c) (3) jurisprudence as "a consistent
saga of ill-considered and piecemeal development." Laura Brown Chisolm, Sinking the
Think Tanks Upstream: The Use and Misuse of Tax Exemption Law to Address the Use and Misuse
of Tax-Exempt Organizations by Politicians, 51 U. Pr. L. R v. 577, 620 (1990). She explains
that
[e]xempt organization law in general, and particularly the law concerning
... political activities of exempt organizations, has been driven by anecdo-
tal accounts of perceived abuses of section 501 (c) (3) tax-exempt status.
Rule after rule has been passed with little or no discussion, and with little or
no serious consideration by anyone but the individuals who are outraged by
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political campaign activity to include both "direct[ ] and indirect[ ]'7
activities and then basing this determination upon "all the surround-
ing facts and circumstances."8 Without more specific guidance, chari-
ties have been forced to rely on IRS materials that are sometimes
conflicting, sometimes counterintuitive, and almost never judicially
proven. Here, perhaps more than anywhere else, the IRS has spoken
out of both sides of its mouth-warning that the prohibition is "abso-
lute" and that any violation, no matter how small, will result in the loss
of tax-exempt status9 and then issuing Delphic pronouncements that
seem to allow exempt organizations to participate in voter registration
drives,10 sponsor debates between candidates," distribute candidates'
voting records, 12 publish candidate responses to questionnaires,' 3 and
even provide facilities for candidates to make campaign speeches' 4
without violating the prohibition. To make matters worse, lingering,
unanswered constitutional questions continue to cast doubt upon
whether the government may even impose this prohibition upon char-
ities in the first place. In short, § 501(c) (3) jurisprudence lacks cer-
tainty, coherence, and a unifying rationale.
This Note surveys and critiques § 501(c) (3)'s ban on political
campaign activity with an eye toward resolving the uncertainty and
incoherence that surrounds this area of the law. Part I summarizes
the statutory framework of § 501 (c) (3) and describes the constitu-
tional difficulties raised by both the prohibition against political cam-
paign activity itself and the IRS's enforcement of this prohibition. In
addition to providing background information on § 501(c) (3), this
Part suggests that the important constitutional concerns implicated by
§ 501(c) (3) heighten the need for certainty in this area of the law.
Part II dissects the judicial decisions and IRS materials that deal with
§ 501 (c) (3)'s ban on political campaign activity to identify those fac-
tors that seem to play a dominant role in their mode of analysis.
Rather than simply repeating the black-letter rules the IRS has laid
the anecdotes or who sense themselves to have been victimized by the pur-
ported abuses. What has emerged is a series of wide-sveeping responses
driven by small problems and uninformed by careful consideration of the
broader perspective.
Id. at 620-21.
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-i (c) (3) (iii) (as amended in 1990).
8 Id. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(c) (3) (iv).
9 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS HANDBOOK § 3(10) (1) (1989).
10 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-17-001 (Sept. 5, 1990).
11 See Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989);
Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73.
12 See Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178; Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,444 (July 15, 1980).
13 See Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154.
14 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,902 (July 15, 1974); Gregory D. Baird, Comment, In-
dependent Institutions of Higher Education and .L RC. § 501 (c)(3): Guidelines for Conducting Polit-
ical Campaign Activities on Campus, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 129, 149 (1997).
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down, this Part attempts to devise a means to explain these rulings as a
coherent whole. In short, this Part seeks to identify those "facts and
circumstances" that are relevant to § 501 (c) (3)'s prohibition of polit-
ical campaign activity. Finally, Part III examines the problems with
the existing IRS approach to political campaign activities and the stat-
utory structure. This Part then formulates a proposed test from the
existing modes of analysis that helps to resolve the uncertainty and
inherent tension found in § 501 (c) (3) jurisprudence.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Section 501 (c) (3)'s Requirements and Interpretations
Section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code imposes four re-
quirements upon those organizations seeking tax-exempt status. First,
the entity seeking tax exemption must be "organized and operated
exclusively for" an exempt purpose.15 Second, the organization's
earnings must not "inure [ ] to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual."1 6 Third, the organization cannot devote a substantial
part of its activities to lobbying or attempts to influence legislation.' 7
Fourth, the organization must not participate or intervene in a polit-
ical campaign in support of or in opposition to a candidate.' 8 While
the legislative history offers scant explanation for the political restric-
tions, 19 legislators subsequently have justified these restrictions as a
means of furthering the "Congressional polic[y] that the U.S. Treas-
ury should be neutral in political affairs."20
15 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
16 Id.
17 See id.
18 See id. In a questionable but understandable exercise of statutory interpretation,
the Supreme Court has engrafted a fifth requirement onto § 501 (c) (3). See Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585 (1983). In addition to the four requirements for
tax exemption under § 501 (c) (3) listed above, a charitable organization cannot engage in
any activity that is "contrary to settled public policy." Id,
19 See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 5.2 (7th ed.
1992); Wilfred R. Caron & Deirdre Dessingue, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3): Practical and Constitutional
Implications of "Political" Activity Restrictions, 2 J.L. & POL. 169, 186 (1985).
20 H.R. REP. No. 100-391, pt. 2, at 1625 (1987); see also Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d
184, 185 (1930) (opinion of Hand, J.) ("[Political agitation] must be conducted without
public subvention; the Treasury stands aside from them."). But see Anne Berrill Carroll,
Religion, Politics, and the IRS: Defining the Limits of Tax Law Controls on Political Expression by
Churches, 76 M.A~Q. L. REv. 217, 251-52 (1992) ("At present, numerous organizations ex-
empt from the payment of federal income tax under subsections of Section 501 other than
Section 501(c) (3) may engage in unlimited amounts of campaign activity... [, including
those] organizations created specifically to raise money for and carry out election cam-
paigns... ."); Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., On Not Rendering to Caesar The Unconstitutional-
ity of Tax Regulation of Activities of Religious Organizations Relating to Politics, 40 DEPAUL L.
REv. 1, 32 (1990) (explaining that prior to 1986, the Code afforded "a tax credit for contri-
butions to candidates").
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Despite the apparent similarity between attempts to influence leg-
islation and political campaign activities, important differences char-
acterize the two restrictions. As the text of § 501(c) (3) indicates, an
exempt organization violates the prohibition against attempting to in-
fluence legislation 2' only when the attempts comprise a "substantial
part" of the organization's activities. 22 An exempt organization that
fails this substantial part test automatically loses its tax-exempt status.25
Although courts have not carefully defined the amount of activity nec-
essary to constitute a substantial part, substantiality appears to fall
somewhere between five and sixteen percent of an organization's total
activities. 24
To avoid the vagaries and the harsh penalty25 of the substantial
part test, most § 501 (c) (3) organizations can choose § 501(h)'s safe
harbor provisions.26 Section 501 (h) permits § 501 (c) (3) organiza-
tions to spend a set percentage of their exempt-purposes expenditures
in a given year on lobbying activities without losing their tax-exempt
status. 27 Any § 501(h)-electing exempt organization that exceeds the
21 The IRS defines "legislation" as "action by the Congress, by any State legislature, by
any local council or similar governing body, or by the public in a referendum, initiative,
constitutional amendment, or similar procedure." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1(c) (3) (ii) (b) (as amended in 1990).
22 I.R.C. § 501(c) (3).
23 See id. § 170(c)(2)(D); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(v) (as amended in 1990).
24 See Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1146-47 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (holding that an
organization violated the "substantial requirement" limitation when the organization di-
rected 16-17% of its annual budgetary expenditures toward influencing legislation);
Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907, 912 (6th Cir. 1955) (finding less than five
percent of an organization's activities to be insubstantial); see also Caron & Dessingue, supra
note 19, at 172-73 & n.16 (discussing the lobbying restriction in general terms).
25 See Caron & Dessingue, supra note 19, at 172 n.16 (identifying the "lack of clarity"
of the substantial part test); Edward D. Coleman, Lobbying Update and Advice for the Coming
Election Year, C693 A.L.I.-A.B.4. 199, 204 (1991) (describing the substantial part test as
"vague, subjective, and difficult to apply"); Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest:
Rethinking the Internal Revenue Code's Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 Txx. L. REv. 1269,
1279 n.25 (1993) (explaining that "there exists no meaningful measure of what is
substantial").
26 See I.R.C. § 501(h). Section 501(h)'s safe harbor provision reads in pertinent part:
In the case of an organization to which this subsection applies, exemp-
tion from taxation under subsection (a) shall be denied because a substan-
tial part of the activities of such organization consists of carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, but only if
such organization normally-
(A) makes lobbying expenditures in excess of the lobbying ceiling
amount for such organization for each taxable year, or
(B) makes grass roots expenditures in excess of the grass roots ceiling
amount for such organization for each taxable year.
Id. § 501(h) (1). Churches and other religious charitable organizations cannot make a
§ 501(h) election. See id. § 501(h) (5). Any organization failing to make a § 501(h) elec-
tion will be subject to the substantial part test by default. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h)-i (a) (1)
to -1 (a) (2) (as amended in 1990).
27 See I.RC. § 501(h) (2). The permissible lobbying expenditure amount is calculated
according to a sliding scale: 20% of the first $500,000 in exempt purposes expenditures,
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permissible level of expenditures for a given year will face a twenty-five
percent excise tax on the excess amount.28 An electing organization
will not lose its exempt status, however, unless its lobbying expendi-
tures exceed the annual permissible amount by 150% over a four-year
period.29
In contrast to § 501 (c) (3)'s prohibition against attempting to in-
fluence legislation, its prohibition against participation in a political
campaign3° is an absolute restriction without any safe harbor provi-
sion.3' As a result, an exempt organization may face the revocation of
its tax-exempt status for any violation, no matter how insignificant.32
Most exempt organizations can avoid the absolute prohibition and en-
gage in political campaign activity by segregating those political cam-
paign activities into a § 501(c) (4) social welfare organization.33
Contributors to a § 501 (c) (4) affiliate, however, may not deduct these
donations on their individual income tax returns. 34 Additionally,
§ 501 (c) (4) affiliates may participate only in a limited amount of polit-
ical campaign activity.35 Although the IRS has not defined the exact
amount of permissible political campaign activity, it has ruled that a
$100,000 plus 15% of the second $500,000, $175,000 plus 10% of the third $500,000, or
$225,000 plus five percent of the exempt purposes expenditures above $1,500,000. See id.
§ 4911(c) (2). No organization, however, may exceed $1,000,000 in lobbying expenditures.
See id.
28 See id. § 4911(a) (1).
29 See id. § 501(h)(1)-(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h)-3(b) (1) (i), -3(c)(7), -3(c)(8) (as
amended in 1990). For a more detailed description of § 501(h)'s provisions, see Galston,
supra note 25, at 1278-80; David A. Wimmer, Curtailing the Political Influence of Section
501 (c)(3) Tax-Exempt Machines, 11 VA. TAx REv. 605, 610-12 (1992).
30 The IRS defines "candidate for public office" for purposes of campaign activity as
"an individual who offers himself, or is proposed by others, as a contestant for an elective
public office, whether such office be national, State, or local." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-
1(c) (3) (iii) (as amended in 1990).
31 See H.R. REP. No. 100-391, pt 2, at 1624-25 (1987) (noting that an organization will
lose its tax-exempt status "if it engages in any political campaign activities or (except as
otherwise provided in sec. 501 (h)) in more than an insubstantial amount of lobbying activ-
ities" (emphasis added)); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 9, § 3(10) (1). House Re-
port 391, however, also describes a provision for excise tax penalties for offending
§ 501 (c) (3) organizations, see H.R- REP. No. 100-391, pt. 2, at 1623, which suggests that not
every violation was intended to result in revocation. See Carroll, supra note 20, at 229-30.
32 The IRS may choose to subject an exempt organization to an excise tax on its polit-
ical expenditures under I.R.C. § 4955. Because the excise tax is purely a remedial alterna-
tive, the IRS still may revoke an organization's tax-exempt status for any proscribed
political campaign activity. See sources cited supra note 31. Furthermore, many exempt
organizations' political activities will not involve political expenditures that the IRS can
subject to an excise tax, which forces the IRS to either revoke the organization's tax-ex-
empt status or ignore the activities altogether.
33 See I.R.C. § 501(c) (4), (h) (3); Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332.
34 See I.R.C. § 170(c) (2) (limiting the types of organizations to which one may make a
charitable contribution).
35 Even though the Treasury regulations defining "social welfare" expressly state that
"[t]he promotion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect participation or in-
tervention in political campaigns," Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (4)-1(a) (2) (ii) (as amended in
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§ 501(c) (4) organization cannot participate in activities so extensive
that they prevent the organization from "primarily engag[ing] in ac-
tivities that promote social welfare."36
B. Constitutional Attacks on Section 501(c) (3)
Ever since § 501(c) (3)'s prohibition against political campaign
activity was first enacted, commentators and litigants have challenged
the provision on numerous constitutional grounds.37 Although
Supreme Court decisions strongly suggest that the Court will uphold
§ 501(c) (3) against some of these constitutional attacks,38 three as-
1990), the IRS has ruled that "the regulations do not impose a complete ban on such
[political campaign] activities," Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332.
36 Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332.
37 In addition to attacking § 501(c) (3) at the constitutional level, commentators also
have attacked § 501(c) (3) interpretations on statutory grounds. One such attack argues
that the stringent requirements governing voter education materials are inconsistent with
§ 501 (c) (3)'s limitation of political campaign activity "'on behalf of a candidate.'" Caron
& Dessingue, supra note 19, at 198 & n.123 (citing FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life 589
F. Supp. 646 (D. Mass. 1984), in which the court classified similar voter education materials
as news to suggest the unreasonableness of the IRS position). Other commentators have
argued that the IRS should have a duty of consistency similar to that of other agencies. If
subject to this duty, the IRS would be required to follow its prior decisions or adequately
explain its deviation from precedent. See 2 KENNETH CuL, DAvis & RicHARD J. PmRCE, JR.,
ADMinSTRATrI LAW TkEAXSE, § 11.5 (3d ed. 1994); Lawrence Zelenak, Should Courts Re-
quire the Internal Revenue Service to Be Consistent?, 40 TAx L. Rxv. 411 (1985).
38 Because § 501(c)(3) exempts churches and other religious organizations, a
number of commentators and litigants have argued that § 501(c) (3) violates the Free Exer-
cise Clauses. See, e.g., Caron & Dessingue, supra note 19, at 181-93; Gaffney, supra note 20,
at 35-39. These commentators found support in cases like Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S.
707 (1981), in which the Court stated:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct
proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of
conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden
upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringe-
ment upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.
Id. at 717-18. The Court dramatically altered the Free Exercise Clause test, however, in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith,
the Court stated that when "the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise
valid provision [imposes upon the free exercise of religion], the First Amendment has not
been offended." Id. at 878. Because § 501(c) (3) applies generally to all qualifying charita-
ble organizations, religious and nonreligious, it seems to satisfy Smith's requirements and
thereby avoids an unconstitutional infringement upon the freedom of religion.
The Court also seems to have resolved challenges to § 501(c) (3) under the Establish-
ment Clause. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Court set forth the leading
Establishment Clause test, the third prong of which requires that "the statute must not
foster 'excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). But see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (calling into question the Court's continued commitment to
the Lemon test by finding no Establishment Clause violation without explicitly applying the
Lemon test). In Wal, the Court held that granting religious organizations a tax exemption
did not violate the Establishment Clause and stated that "[i]n analyzing [the taxation of
churches or their exemption] the questions are whether the involvement is excessive, and
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pects of § 501 (c) (3) continue to raise doubts about the provision's
validity. The first constitutional challenge to § 501 (c) (3) focuses
upon the idea of limiting political involvement itself. It asks whether
the government may condition favorable tax status upon the relin-
quishment of rights to engage in political speech. The second consti-
tutional challenge attacks the congressional expression of that idea. It
asks whether the existing text of § 501 (c) (3) presents a definition of
political campaign activity that is clear enough that ordinary individu-
als need not guess at its meaning or application. The third challenge
addresses the manner in which the IRS has enforced the provision. It
asks whether the IRS has selectively prosecuted some organizations
while refusing to prosecute other similarly situated organizations. Be-
cause these constitutional concerns cast a shadow of uncertainty over
the substance of § 501 (c) (3) jurisprudence, this Part briefly addresses
each of these constitutional challenges in turn.
whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an
impermissible degree of entanglement." 397 U.S. at 675; see also Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672, 688 (1971) (opinion of Burger, CJ.) (finding that construction grants to reli-
gious colleges do not create excessive entanglement and identifying the existence of a
continuing financial relationship and financial audits, especially those requiring a distinc-
tion between religious and nonreligious expenditures, as factors). Thus, under Walz an
excessive entanglement problem would seem to result only if the IRS constantly monitors
church services or financial records in an effort to root out any and all statements or activi-
ties that might violate § 501(c) (3). See Scott W. Putney, The IRC's Prohibition of Political
Campaigning by Churches and the Establishment Clause; FLA. B.J., May 1990, at 27, 30 (noting
that a "'comprehensive system of supervision ... would inevitably lead to an unconstitu-
tional administrative entanglement between church and state'" (quoting Aguilar v. Felton,
473 U.S. 402, 410 (1985))).
Practically, however, the chances are slim that an IRS investigation of alleged
§ 501(c) (3) violations will create an excessive entanglement. First, more recent cases indi-
cate that a high level of entanglement may be required to implicate the Establishment
Clause. SeeJimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 394 (1990)
(upholding the extensive auditing and administrative procedures of California's sales and
use tax on the ground that their "administrative and recordkeeping burdens d[id] not rise
to a constitutionally significant level"); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor,
471 U.S. 290, 305 (1985) (holding that the Fair Labor Standards Act's requirement that
certain financial records be kept by exempt organizations did not create an excessive en-
tanglement). Second, the IRS simply may limit its investigation of proscribed political ac-
tivities to nonintrusive means. For example, when the IRS merely collects a church
newsletter after reports that the newsletter contains an endorsement of a particular candi-
date, it would be difficult to argue that this action creates an excessive entanglement. See
Oliver S. Thomas, The Power to Destroy: The Eroding Constitutional Arguments for Church Tax
Exemption and the Practical Effect on Churches, 22 CUMB. L. REv. 605, 631 & n.146 (1992). For
an example of nonintrusive enforcement of § 501 (c) (3)'s political activity prohibitions, see
Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Richardson, 970 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1997), in which the IRS re-
voked the tax-exempt status of a § 501(c) (3) organization after the organization placed
advertisements in two national newspapers opposing a candidate. See id. at 13. Part I.B.3,
infra, offers a more detailed discussion of Branch Ministries.
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1. Freedom of Speech
Some commentators have attacked § 501 (c) (3)'s prohibition
against political activity for conditioning a government benefit in the
form of a favorable tax status on the surrender of First Amendment
rights.3 9 Speiser v. Randall40 provides the foundation for this argu-
ment. In Speiser, the Supreme Court struck down a California statute
that required veterans to sign a loyalty oath to receive a special prop-
erty tax exemption, holding that it unconstitutionally infringed upon
the freedom of speech.41 The Court reasoned that the "deterrent ef-
fect [of the statute's condition] is the same as if the State were to fine
[the veterans] for this speech."42 Thus, Speiser strongly suggests that
§ 501 (c) (3)'s similar conditioning of an income tax exemption on the
nonexercise of political speech rights violates the First Amendment.43
In Regan v. Taxation With Representation," however, the Court up-
held § 501 (c) (3)'s lobbying restrictions. The Court began with the
observation that Taxation With Representation also qualified as a tax-
exempt § 501(c) (4) organization. 45 Because § 501 (c) (4) organiza-
tions may engage in substantial lobbying activities and still retain all of
§ 501(c) (3)'s advantages, except the personal tax deduction for con-
tributors, the Court reasoned that an organization may enjoy the
favorable § 501(c) (3) contributor deduction and engage in lobbying
activities simply by segregating its operations into § 501 (c) (3) and
§ 501 (c) (4) components. 46 The Court then distinguished Speiser by
concluding that § 501(c) (3)'s restrictions on lobbying activities did
not represent an unconstitutional condition; rather, they represented
a choice by Congress not to subsidize these activities.47 Analogizing
tax exemptions to cash grants,48 the Court noted that § 501(c) (3)'s
restrictions merely represented Congress's "refus[al] to pay for the
lobbying out of public moneys." 49 In a concurring opinion that two
39 See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 20, at 254-56; Gaffney, supra note 20, at 32.
40 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
41 See id. at 515, 529.
42 Id. at 518.
43 See Thomas, supra note 38, at 620-21 ("If it is unconstitutional to require... [the]
surrender [of] ... speech rights in order to qualify for a property tax exemption, why is it
not equally unconstitutional for an income tax exemption?").
44 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
45 See id. at 543.
46 See id. at 544.
47 See id. at 545-46. The Court relied upon Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498
(1959), to conclude that the First Amendment does not obligate Congress to subsidize
lobbying. See Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 546. In Cammarano, the Court held
that the denial of a deduction for lobbying as a business expense did not infringe upon the
First Amendment. See 358 U.S. at 513.
48 See Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 544.
49 Id. at 545.
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otherJustices joined, Justice Blackmun emphasized the importance of
the § 501 (c) (4) alternative to the constitutionality of § 501 (c) (3):
Section 501(c) (3) does not merely deny a subsidy for lobbying activ-
ities; it deprives an otherwise eligible organization of its tax-exempt
status and its eligibility to receive tax-deductible contributions for
all its activities, whenever one of those activities is "substantial lobby-
ing." Because lobbying is protected by the First Amendment,
§ 501(c) (3) therefore denies a significant benefit to organizations
choosing to exercise their constitutional rights.
The constitutional defect that would inhere in 501(c) (3) alone
is avoided by § 501(c) (4).50
The subsequent decisions of Rust v. Sullivan5 ' and FCC v. League
of Women Voters52 confirm the reasoning of Taxation With Representation.
In Rust, the Court upheld regulations denying federal Title X funds to
family planning organizations that provide abortion counseling.53
The Court determined that the regulations did not prevent these or-
ganizations from engaging in abortion-related speech generally, but
merely required that they conduct this speech separately from those
projects receiving Title X funds. 54 By contrast, in League of Women Vot-
ers, the Court struck down a law withholding federal funds from those
public television and radio stations offering editorial opinions because
the stations could not form affiliate organizations that did not receive
federal funds to engage in this editorializing.55 Thus, Taxation With
Representation, Rust, and League of Women Voters suggest that the govern-
ment may condition the receipt of a benefit on the relinquishment of
free speech rights only if the recipient can segregate its activities in a
manner that enables it to engage in the prohibited speech and still
obtain the desired benefit for its other activities.
Unfortunately, this rule leaves several serious constitutional ques-
tions regarding § 501 (c) (3) unanswered. 56 First, Taxation With Repre-
sentation's rationale suggests that § 501 (c) (3)'s prohibition against
political campaign activity creates an unconstitutional condition.
While § 501 (c) (4) organizations may engage in "substantial lobbying
50 Id. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (footnote and citations omitted).
51 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
52 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
53 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 198-99, 203.
54 See id. at 203.
55 See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400-01.
56 In Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856-57 (10th
Cir. 1972), the Tenth Circuit found § 501(c) (3)'s prohibition against political campaign
activity constitutional. The court reasoned that the loss of tax-exempt status did not un-
constitutionally burden speech because tax exemptions are merely privileges. See id. at
857. The court, however, did not consider Speisers unconstitutional condition doctrine,
leading some commentators to remark that Christian Echoes "is of questionable precedential
value." Caron & Dessingue, supra note 19, at 189.
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to advance their exempt purposes,"57 the IRS places limits upon the
amount of political campaign activity in which both § 501(c) (3) and
§ 501(c) (4) organizations may participate.58 Thus, a § 501 (c) (3) ex-
empt organization wishing to endorse a particular candidate-an ac-
tivity that § 501(c) (4) forbids as wel159-cannot then segregate its
political activities into § 501 (c) (3) and § 501 (c) (4) components in ac-
cordance with Taxation With Representation. Instead, the organization
must choose either to lose its favorable tax status and provide the en-
dorsement or to refrain from providing the endorsement and main-
tain its tax exemption. 60
Second, Taxation With Representation fails to address those situa-
tions in which nonpolitical exempt activities and political activities are
so intertwined as to make their separation impossible. For instance,
the severance of political expression from a religious organization's
otherwise exempt activities would be impossible when a religious
leader gives a sermon or other religious instruction.61 As several com-
mentators asked, "Should a priest announce at the outset of his ser-
mon that he is now speaking not for the § 501 (c) (3) church but for its
§ 501 (c) (4) affiliate?" 62 The difficulty of severing exempt from non-
exempt activities suggests that a § 501 (c) (4) affiliate may not provide
the adequate alternative means for the exercise of free speech that
Taxation With Representation and its progeny require.63
2. Vagueness
Commentators also have attacked § 501(c) (3) and the related
regulations by arguing that they are void for vagueness in failing to
distinguish adequately between those permissible and prohibited
57 Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 543 (1983).
58 See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
59 See Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332; Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations,
105 HARv. L. REv. 1578, 1665 & n.57 (1992).
60 Even if § 501(c) (4) organizations were able to participate in extensive political
campaign activities, the organization-specific nature of an endorsement as political speech
raises concerns similar to those Justice Blackmun expressed in his concurrence to Taxation
With Representation, when he stated that "[i]t hardly answers one person's objection to a
restriction on his speech that another person, outside his control, may speak for him." 461
U.S. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Caron & Dessingue, supra note 19, at 192
(noting that "although the section 501(c) (4) affiliate might satisfy the articulated govern-
ment interest in nonsubsidization of political activity, it nonetheless would curtail the First
Amendmdnt rights of Exempt Organizations").
61 See Caron & Dessingue, supra note 19, at 193.
62 Id.
63 Cf FEG v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 258-63 (1986) (finding
federal election law provisions mandating that organizations make certain independent
expenditures through separately funded political action committees an unconstitutional
burden upon the organizations' political speech).
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political activities and speech.64 Those phrases of § 501(c) (3) that
commentators have perceived as unconstitutionally vague include the
following: "participate in . .. any political campaign," "carrying on
propaganda," "attempting to influence legislation," and a "substantial
part."65 Although explanatory regulations conceivably could remedy
the vagueness problem, the open-ended definitions and tests in this
area of the law merely compound the uncertainty, arguably creating a
situation in which exempt organizations lack identifiable guidelines
upon which to base their behavior.66 The absence of any meaningful
legislative history for the political activities provisions of § 501 (c) (3)
further complicates matters.67
A statute may be void for vagueness when (1) it is so indetermi-
nate that ordinary individuals must guess at its meaning or applica-
tion 68 or (2) it lacks sufficient definiteness for enforcement in a
nonarbitrary manner.69 In Thomas v. Collins,70 for example, the Court
struck down a statute restricting "solicitation" by labor unions, stating
that "the supposedly clear-cut distinction between discussion, lauda-
tion, general advocacy, and solicitation puts the speaker... wholly at
the mercy of the varied understanding of his hearers .... Such a
distinction offers no security for free discussion . . . [and] blankets
with uncertainty whatever may be said." 71 In Big Mama Rag v. United
States,72 the leading case that addresses the question of vagueness and
tax-exempt organizations, a feminist organization challenged as un-
constitutionally vague certain Treasury regulations requiring
§ 501(c) (3) educational organizations that "'advocate[ ] a particular
position"' to present a "full and fair exposition" of the pertinent
facts. 73 The court agreed with the challenge and struck down the reg-
ulations as unconstitutionally vague for failing to "explain[ ] which
applicant organizations are subject to the standard and... [to] articu-
lat[e] its substantive requirements." 74 The court first criticized the
IRS for equating the terms "advocates a particular position" with "con-
troversial," noting that this definition "gives IRS officials no objective
standard by which to judge which applicant organizations are advo-
64 See, e.g., Caron & Dessingue, supra note 19, at 193-97; Carroll, supra note 20, at 256-
59.
65 See Charles Capetanakis, Abortion Rights Mobilization and Religious Tax Exemptions, 34
CATH. LAW. 169, 189 (1991).
66 See id.
67 See sources cited supra note 19.
68 See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
69 See Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
70 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
71 Id. at 535.
72 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980).




cacy groups... [and leaves only] one's subjective notion [as the mea-
sure] of what is 'controversial.'- 75 The court then challenged the "full
and fair exposition" standard with a barrage of questions:
What makes an exposition "full and fair"? Can it be "fair" without
being "full"? Which facts are "pertinent"? How does one tell
whether an exposition of the pertinent facts is "sufficient ... to
permit an individual or the public to form an independent opinion
or conclusion"? And who is to make all of these determinations? 76
Unable to find satisfactory answers to these questions, the court con-
cluded that "[tihe regulation's vagueness is especially apparent...
[from the] individualistic ... standard: the reactions of members of
the public."77
One could make similar arguments about the inherent vagueness
of § 501 (c) (3) terms such as "propaganda," "substantial part," "at-
tempts to influence legislation," and "participation in a political cam-
paigu." What is propaganda, and who makes that determination?
How does one distinguish attempts to influence legislation and partic-
ipation in a political campaign from attempts to educate about legisla-
tion and participation in educational and religious exercises involving
an election? And exactly how much is a substantial part? The difficult
lines that § 501 (c) (3)'s prohibition of political activity calls the courts
and the IRS to draw very well may approach the type of subjectivity
that the Big Mama Rag court found unacceptable. 78
A number of problems, however, weaken the argument that
§ 501 (c) (3) 's prohibition of political campaign activity is unconstitu-
tionally vague. First, the terms "participation in a political campaign"
and "attempts to influence legislation" are not so indeterminate that
ordinary people must guess at their meanings. If these provisions
meet the vagueness standard, then few statutes will pass muster. Sec-
ond, Big Mama Rag no longer may be the law in the District of Colum-
bia Circuit. In a subsequent case, the D.C. Circuit upheld an IRS
ruling dealing with the same regulations without addressing directly
their constitutionality.79 Third, because the statute already has sur-
vived a First Amendment challenge, many courts may hesitate to find
the statute unconstitutionally vague.8 0 Finally, even if courts were to
find the political prohibition portions of § 501(c) (3) unconstitution-
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1037 (omission in original).
77 Id.
78 See id.
79 See National Alliance v. United States, 710 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
80 See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983); see also
Capetanakis, supra note 65, at 190 ("It seems unlikely, however, that the statute will be
struck down on vagueness grounds, as its constitutionality has previously been upheld on
other first and fifth amendment challenges.").
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ally vague, the statute still could survive with a narrower construction
of the political activity prohibitions. 81
3. Equal Protection and Selective Prosecution
Perhaps the most troubling constitutional concern relating to
§ 501 (c) (3) revolves around the IRS's "haphazard" pattern of enforce-
ment. 2 By ignoring a number of high profile cases of political in-
volvement by exempt organizations, the IRS has placed itself in a
position in which any crackdown on the political activity of exempt
organizations appears to result from political motivations or expedi-
ency. For instance, Humberto Cardinal Medeiros, the Archbishop of
Boston, publicly encouraged Catholics not to vote for pro-abortion
candidates the day before the Democratic primary8 3 without drawing
any response from the IRS. Similarly, during the 1988 presidential
campaign, a number of prominent black ministers endorsed Jesse
Jackson 4 and took part in a well-publicized tour of 500 churches, rais-
ing as much as $300,000 in campaign contributions from offering
plate collections. 8 5 Even President Clinton has been a party to these
questionable campaign activities, preaching a Sunday morning ser-
mon in a Los Angeles church in which he "weave [d] scriptural refer-
ences into his standard campaign speech. '8 6 Despite the extensive
political involvement by churches and other exempt organizations
81 See Caron & Dessingue, supra note 19, at 196-97. But see Carroll, supra note 20, at
259 ("[T] he rulings demonstrate that merely narrowing the application of the prohibition,
while retaining the vague language of the current statute, regulations, and Treasury rul-
ings, would not resolve the intricate definitional and enforcement problems posed by relig-
iously inspired political expression.").
82 Carroll, supra note 20, at 218, 219 (identifying IRS enforcement of § 501 (c) (3) as
"haphazard" and commenting on "the uncertain and sometimes inconsistent interpreta-
tions given the campaign activity prohibition"). Carroll also presents a cogent summary of
the political activity of religious organizations throughout the 1980s. See id at 220-27; see
also Beth A. Sabbath, Tax Exempt Political Educational Organizations: Is the Exemption Being
Abused?, 41 TAx LAw. 847, 861 (1988) (noting that "the basis for the exemption [of educa-
tional organizations], the free flow of the information, cannot be achieved if the exemp-
tion restrictions are not equally enforced").
83 SeeJames Nelson Goodsell, Cardinal's Abortion Letter Stirs Political Controversy, CHRIs-
TIAN ScI. MONrroR, Sept. 15, 1980, at 4; Michael Knight, Cardinal Cautions Voters on Abortion,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 16, 1980, at A20.
84 See Laurent Belsie, Black Churches and US Politics, CHRISnTAN SCi. MONITOR, May 2,
1988, at 1; Margaret B. Carlson, More than a Crusade, TIME, Mar. 7, 1988, at 16.
85 See Passing the Plate, U.S. NEWs & WoRLD REP., Feb. 15, 1988, at 20. The Americans
United for Separation of Church and State protested Jackson's activities and requested an
IRS investigation, but the IRS took no action. See I.RS. Is Urged to InvestigateJackson's Church
Collections, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1988, at B6.
86 Gwen Ifill, Campaigning on Sundays Brings out a Different Bill Clinton, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 1992, at A14.
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during this period, however, the IRS chose only to reprimand Jimmy
Swaggert Ministries for its endorsement of Pat Robertson. 87
This inconsistent pattern of enforcement culminated in Branch
Ministries, Inc. v. Richardson.88 Four days before the 1992 presidential
election, Branch Ministries placed full-page advertisements in the
Washington Times and USA Today that described Bill Clinton's views on
abortion, homosexuality, and condom distribution in public schools
and urged Christians not to vote for him.8 9 The IRS subsequently re-
voked Branch Ministries's tax-exempt status, prompting Branch Minis-
tries to bring suit.90 Relying on United States v. Armstrong,91 the court
found that Branch Ministries had presented a colorable claim of selec-
tive prosecution and opened IRS records for discovery.92 In particu-
lar, the court cited the involvement of the Catholic Church in the
abortion issue and the black churches' activities during the 1988 elec-
tion as examples of the IRS's failure to revoke the exempt status of
other politically active churches.93 The court felt that the IRS's past
enforcement efforts indicated a disparity in treatment of those simi-
larly situated and that the rare and "draconian" measure of revocation
provided some evidence of discriminatory intent.94
Exempt organizations seeking to be both politically active and tax
exempt, however, cannot place their faith solely upon a selective pros-
ecution defense. Even the receptive Branch Ministries court conceded
that "[a] plaintiff bringing a selective prosecution claim carries a
heavy burden."95 These claims are rare and difficult to prove. Branch
Ministries does not create a safe harbor for exempt organizations, but
it strikingly illustrates the utter confusion that shrouds § 501 (c) (3)
jurisprudence.
87 See Shun Politics, Tax-Exempt Groups Told L.A. Tims, Jan. 12, 1992, at B5. Recently,
the IRS appears to have taken a more active role in investigating prohibited political cam-
paign activity. See Elizabeth MacDonald & Jacob M. Schlesinger, Group Targets Politically
Active Churches for Audits, WAu.L ST.J., Mar. 20, 1997, atA18. Conservatives assert that these
investigations focus on organizations that have criticized the current administration. Seeid
88 970 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1997).
89 See id. at 13.
90 See id.
91 517 U.S. 456 (1996). Armstrong holds that for discovery to proceed on a selective
prosecution claim, the defendant must show (1) discriminatory effect on those prosecuted
with regard to those similarly situated and (2) discriminatory intent. See id& at 465.
92 See Branch Ministries, 970 F. Supp. at 15-17.
93 See id. at 16.
94 IaL at 17.




FACTORS INVOLVED IN SECrION 501 (c) (3) ANALYsis
The regulations governing § 501 (c) (3) prohibit exempt organiza-
tions from "[d]irectly or indirectly . . . participat[ing] in, or in-
terven [ing] in... any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition
to any candidate for public office."9 6 While the regulations expressly
identify the "publishing or distributing of statements" 9 7 as a prohib-
ited activity, they fail to offer a more detailed method of determining
what constitutes proscribed campaign activity. Instead, the IRS con-
siders "all the surrounding facts and circumstances" and makes a deci-
sion on a case-by-case basis.98 As one might expect, however, the IRS
does not truly consider "all the surrounding facts and circumstances."
Common sense dictates that some set of "facts and circumstances" must
be particularly relevant to the inquiry, and the presence or absence of
some identifiable "face' is necessary as a practical matter to distinguish
meaningfully between those activities that are permitted and those
that are prohibited. This Part explores the following four factors that
shape the analysis that the courts and the IRS employ: (1) whether the
reasonable consequences of the activity have the potential to influ-
ence voter opinion or provide financial or volunteer assistance to the
candidate; (2) whether the organization favors or disfavors a particu-
lar candidate or candidates; (3) whether the activity corresponds with
the organization's legitimate exempt purpose; and (4) whether cir-
cumstances exist that call for the exercise of leniency.
A. Whether the Reasonable Consequences of the Organization's
Activity Have the Potential to Influence Voter Opinion or
Provide Financial or Volunteer Assistance to a Candidate
An exempt organization participates in a political campaign
whenever the reasonable consequences of the organization's activity
have the potential to influence voter opinion or to provide financial
96 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(b)(3) (ii) (as amended in 1990).
97 Id.
98 Id. § 1.501 (c) (3)-l (c) (3) (iv). Although this specific regulation addresses whether
an exempt organization is properly characterized as a § 501(c) (4) "action" organization,
the analysis also applies to § 501(c) (3) organizations because an organization does not
qualify for exemption under § 501 (c) (3) if it "engage[s] in activities which characterize it
as an action organization." Id. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(b) (3) (iii). Accordingly, IRS materials ex-
plain that "[w]hether a particular activity, action, or expenditure constitutes the conduct
of prohibited political activity [for a § 501 (c) (3) organization] depends on all the facts and
circumstances." I.R.S. Notice 94-111, 1994-37 I.R.B. 36; see also I.R.S. News Release IR-96-23
(Apr. 24, 1996) ("Whether an organization [exempt under § 501(c) (3)] is engaging in




or volunteer aid to a candidate.9 9 This factor divides into two compo-
nents. The first component seeks to describe what the IRS means by
"political campaign activity." The IRS appears to define broadly polit-
ical campaign activity to include any activity that has the potential to
influence voter opinion or that provides financial or volunteer assist-
ance to a candidate. 0 0 Clearly, inherently political activities such as
endorsements, 10 1 campaign contributions, 10 2 and the distribution of
voting records 0 3 have the potential to influence voter opinion or pro-
vide financial or volunteer aid to a candidate. They thereby constitute
political campaign activity.10 4 Political campaign activity, however, is
not limited to inherently political activities. An exempt organization
may influence an election even when it engages in seemingly
nonpolitical activities.
The IRS considers three factors when determining whether an
action has the potential to influence voter opinion: the manner of
distribution, the manner of presentation, and the timing of the distri-
bution. 10 5 Activities during a political campaign, distributions that are
targeted to a particular geographic area or presented to the general
public, and materials that present a candidate in a favorable light all
increase the likelihood that the IRS will identify the activity as involve-
ment in a political campaign. Thus, when an exempt organization
runs television advertisements during a campaign to promote its an-
nual fundraising drive and those advertisements feature a candidate
for office, IRS materials suggest that the organization has engaged in
impermissible political campaign activity.'0 6 The IRS apparently be-
lieves that advertisements that charities air during an election posi-
99 See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-08-037 (Feb. 20, 1998) (identifying voter guides as prohib-
ited political campaign activity because "they were aimed at influencing the public's judg-
ment about the... positions of candidates").
100 Whether or not these activities actually influence voter opinion appears to be irrele-
vant. See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-09-007 (Dec. 6, 1995) (rejecting the argument that
because these activities would amount to no more than "a pastor preaching to the choir,"
"ideological entities could directly communicate with their memberships or selected audi-
ences on political candidate preference").
1O1 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 94-111, 1994-37 I.R.B. 36 ("Contributions to political cam-
paign[s and] public statements of position (verbal and written) in favor of or in opposition
to candidates for office... would clearly violate the prohibition against political activity.").
102 See id.
103 See Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178; Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,444 (July 15, 1980).
104 This category also includes activities such as campaign financing arrangements, the
provision of campaign workers, voter registration drives, debates between candidates, the
publication of candidate responses to questionnaires, and the provision of facilities for
candidates to make campaign speeches. See Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73; Rev. Rul. 78-
248, 1978-1 C.B. 154; Tech. Adv. Mer. 91-17-001 (Sept. 5, 1990); Baird, supra note 14, at
149-50.
105 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178 (applying these elements to a hypotheti-
cal fact situation).
106 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,137 (Oct. 22, 1979).
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tively associate the candidate with the charity, giving the
advertisements the potential to influence voter opinion.
The second component addresses the question of what kind of
"participation" violates the prohibition. The IRS's inquiry focuses not
upon whether the organization intends to be involved in a political
campaign, but upon whether "the reasonable consequences of [the
organization's] activities" amount to involvement in a political cam-
paign.'0 7 In this way, the IRS adopts an objective approach in defin-
ing participation in campaign activities under § 501 (c) (3). Any
activity that results in an exempt organization's involvement in a polit-
ical campaign triggers the prohibition regardless of the organization's
motivation. Subjective questions concerning the organization's actual
motivations are simply "irrelevant."'08 Thus, "[a]n organization can
violate the proscription even if it acts for reasons other than interven-
ing in a political campaign."'0 9
A difficult question arises, however, when an organization unin-
tentionally or inadvertently engages in activities that influence an elec-
tion. The plain meaning of § 501 (c) (3) suggests that unintentional or
inadvertent activities do not violate the prohibition. "Participation" in
an activity suggests more than merely affecting the outcome of an
event; it implies some kind of intentional involvement. Thus, a bank
teller who mistakenly leaves the bank's doors unlocked hardly has
"participated" in a subsequent bank robbery. Indeed, some courts in-
terpret "participation" in a criminal enterprise under an aiding and
abetting charge to require a showing that the "'defendant... partici-
pated in [the criminal venture] as something he wished to bring
about, and sought by his actions to make it succeed.'"110 The term
"intervene" carries an even stronger connotation of intentional in-
volvement. For example, a party who intervenes in pending court
proceedings is one who "voluntarily interposes""' himself into those
proceedings." 2 Although the existing materials concerning these "in-
107 Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,902 (July 15, 1974) (quoting a memorandum dated May 18,
1960).
108 Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-35-003 (Apr. 19, 1995) (asserting that the IRS has "consist-
ently held that the motivation of an organization is irrelevant when determining whether
the political campaign prohibition has been violated"); see I.R.S. News Release IR-96-23
(Apr. 24, 1996) ("The motivation of an organization is not relevant in determining
whether the political campaign prohibition has been violated.").
109 Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,137 (Oct. 22, 1979); cf. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc.
v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 854 (10th Cir. 1972) ("A religious organization that engages
in substantial activity aimed at influencing legislation is disqualified from tax exemption,
whatever the motivation.").
11o United States v. Cowart, 595 F.2d 1023, 1035 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting United States
v. Congoria, 569 F.2d 422, 425 (5th Cir. 1978)).
111 BiAcK's LAw DIcnoNARY 820 (6th ed. 1990).
112 See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 24.
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advertent" activities are vague, 113 the IRS seems to buckle and read
some element of control or intent into the inquiry. Thus, the IRS may
look for a choice by the exempt organization to involve itself in a cam-
paign. Once the organization makes that choice, however, its motiva-
tions become irrelevant.
Two hypotheticals the IRS raises nicely illustrate these elements
of control and choice. Suppose a candidate suffers a heart attack on
the campaign trail and is taken to a tax-exempt hospital in which he
receives lifesaving medical attention. By saving the life of the candi-
date, the hospital certainly aided the candidate. The hospital, how-
ever, has not participated in a political campaign any more than it
would have participated in a football game by treating an injured
player or a bank robbery by treating an injured suspect. The law may
even require the hospital to treat all emergency patients that come to
the hospital. The hospital made no conscious choice to assist the indi-
vidual's candidacy for public office, and its rendering of lifesaving aid
to the candidate was simply fortuitous. As a result, IRS materials sug-
gest that the hospital's "inadvertent" or peripheral involvement in a
political campaign is not enough to violate the prohibition." 4
Similarly, suppose that an exempt organization invites a speaker
to provide the keynote address at an annual economics symposium.
The day before the event, the speaker announces his candidacy for
office. If the organization allows the candidate to speak at the sympo-
sium, has the organization participated in a political campaign?
Surely the fact that the candidate will speak at a well-publicized sym-
posium has the potential to influence voter opinion. Again, however,
the organization did not choose its political involvement, and penaliz-
ing the organization for the unilateral actions of its speaker seems un-
fair. As a result, IRS materials suggest that this unintentional
involvement in a political campaign does not violate the
prohibition. 15
This factor alone, however, explains only a small amount of
§ 501 (c) (3) jurisprudence. If political campaign activities include all
types of financial or volunteer aid and any actions that may influence
voter opinion, then exempt organizations should not be able to par-
ticipate in voter registration drives," 6 sponsor debates between candi-
113 Compare Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,137 (Oct. 22, 1979) ("We do not mean to imply that
every activity that has an effect on a political campaign is prohibited political activity. We
recognize that organizations may inadvertently support political candidates."), with Tech.
Adv. Mem. 96-09-007 (Dec. 6, 1995) ("[I]ntervention in a political campaign may be subtle
or blatant .... It may even be inadvertent.").
114 Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,137 (Oct. 22, 1979).
115 See id.
116 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-17-001 (Sept. 5, 1990).
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dates,1 17 distribute candidates' voting records, 118 publish candidate
responses to questionnaires," 9 or provide facilities for candidates to
make campaign speeches. 120 Yet the IRS permits these activities in
certain situations. Thus, the inquiry must involve additional
considerations.
B. Whether the Organization Favors or Disfavors a Particular
Candidate or Candidates
Section 501 (c) (3) does not prohibit exempt organizations from
all involvement in political campaigns; it merely prohibits their in-
volvement "on behalf of (or in opposition to) a candidate for public
office.' 121 Thus, in order to violate § 501(c) (3)'s prohibition, an ex-
empt organization either must support or oppose a candidate. In
many instances, the nature of the activity itself establishes the organi-
zation's support or opposition of a particular candidate. Sometimes,
however, the IRS must proceed by implication, basing its finding of
favoritism or bias on the manner of presentation, the manner of distri-
bution, or the timing of the distribution. As a result, this factor has
the practical effect of dividing political campaign activities into two
categories-those campaign activities in which a charity may never
take part and those activities in which it may take part so long as it
does so in a neutral fashion.
The first category represents those political campaign activities
that demonstrate the charity's favoritism or bias by their very nature.
Because these activities are inherently biased, the IRS need only prove
that the exempt organization engaged in the activity to establish a vio-
lation of § 501 (c) (3). Campaign contributions and public statements
for or against a candidate clearly fall within this category. By provid-
ing financial contributions or endorsing a candidate, an exempt or-
ganization necessarily favors the candidate. 122 Thus, when a tax-
exempt religious organization finances the campaigns of its members
who are running for political office, organizes a team of campaign
workers from the exempt organization's membership, and endorses
the candidates in the organization's publications and meetings, the
organization participates in prohibited campaign activity.' 23 Because
17 See Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73.
118 See Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178; Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,444 (July 15, 1980).
119 See Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154.
120 See sources cited supra note 14.
121 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
122 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 94-111, 1994-37 I.R.B. 36 ("Contributions to political cam-
paign [s and] public statements of position (verbal and written) in favor of or in opposition
to candidates for office... would clearly violate the prohibition against political activity.").
123 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,414 (Sept. 25, 1985).
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these activities inherently provide a particular candidate with an ad-
vantage in the election, the IRS expressly forbids them.
An exempt organization also demonstrates favoritism or bias
when it evaluates candidates. Any attempt to rate the qualifications of
candidates will violate § 501 (c) (3) 's prohibition even if the evaluation
employs neutral, identifiable criteria such as professional competence
or character. Thus, when an exempt educational organization rates
candidates for the school board and then supports a slate of the most
qualified, the organization participates in a campaign in violation of
the prohibition. 124 Similarly, an organization that solicits candidates
to conduct their campaigns in accordance with a code of ethics and
then publicizes the names of those candidates who refuse to sign the
code violates the prohibition. 125 Despite the civic good inherent in
publicizing qualified or ethical candidates, these activities violate the
proscription because they necessarily require the exempt organization
to favor or disfavor a particular candidate or candidates.
The Second Circuit recognized the inherent bias in evaluating
candidates in Association of the Bar v. Commissioner.126 In Association of
the Bar, the court addressed the New York City Bar Association's prac-
tice of rating candidates for elective judicial office. 127 The court held
that rating the candidates constituted impermissible political cam-
paign activity and expressly noted that "'ratings, by their very nature,
necessarily will reflect the philosophy of the organization conducting
such activities.""' 28 Thus, in the court's eyes, "[a] candidate who re-
ceives a 'not qualified' rating will derive little comfort from the fact
that the rating may have been made in a nonpartisan manner."' 29
Association of the Bar highlights the sensitivity of the inquiry into
whether an organization has supported a candidate. The Bar Associa-
tion rates all candidates for elective judicial office on the basis of "pro-
fessional ability, experience, character, temperment and the
possession of such special qualifications as the Committee deems de-
sirable for judicial office.' u30 Many campaigns will involve multiple
candidates receiving the same rating of "approved," "not approved,"
or "approved as highly qualified." As a result, an organization may
support a candidate even when it treats two opposing candidates
equally. Furthermore, a candidate rated by the Bar Association may
run unopposed. In this situation, the rating that the candidate re-
124 See Rev. Rul. 67-71, 1967-1 C.B. 125.
125 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,557 (Jan. 19, 1976).
126 858 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1988).
127 See id. at 877.
128 Id. at 880 (quoting Association of the Bar v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 599, 610
(1987)).
129 Id.
130 Id, at 877.
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ceives would have only a minimal impact on the actual outcome of the
race. Yet Association of the Bar identifies even this relatively inconse-
quential rating as prohibited campaign activity.131 Because these rat-
ings unavoidably result in the charity's expression of a favorable or
unfavorable opinion of a candidate and because voters will experience
a favorable or unfavorable reaction to a candidate as a result, even
those ratings that arguably would not affect the outcome of a particu-
lar campaign amount to participation in political campaign activity.
By contrast, an exempt organization may conduct some political
campaign activities without showing favoritism or bias to a candidate.
To be sure, these activities are certain to shape voter opinion of a
candidate; however, exempt organizations may undertake these activi-
ties without violating the prohibition if they do so in a neutral man-
ner. Thus, a public television station may provide candidates with free
air time to present their views so long as it grants every candidate
equal access and it does not endorse any of the views presented. 132
Similarly, an exempt organization may sponsor a debate between can-
didates so long as it structures the debate in a neutral manner by invit-
ing all qualified candidates, by using questions that an independent
panel prepares and that cover a wide range of issues, and by granting
candidates "an equal opportunity to discuss [their] views on each of
the issues discussed."133
The restrictions imposed on the distribution of the candidates'
voting records further demonstrate circumstances under which an ex-
empt organization's neutrality allows it to participate in political cam-
paign activities. First, while the organization may select certain issues
and present its position on those issues, the distribution cannot make
any comparison among the candidates or exclude incumbents who
are not currently running for office.'34 Second, the distribution of
voting records must be limited in amount-preferably to those people
who regularly receive publications from the organization-and can-
not focus on a particular geographic area in which elections are tak-
ing place. 135 Finally, the publication must both explain that selected
votes do not provide an adequate basis for evaluating a candidate and
suggest that the recipient consider other off-the-record factors. 136
The IRS has designed these restrictions to ensure an even-handed
131 See id. at 881.
132 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,902 (July 15, 1974).
133 Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 G.B. 73.
134 See Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178; Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,444 (July 15, 1980).
These publications mark a retreat by the IRS from the position set forth in Revenue Ruling
78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154. In this Ruling, the IRS forbid exempt organizations from disclos-
ing their own position or presenting a limited number of issues. See id.




presentation and to reduce the possibility that an exempt organiza-
tion will act on behalf of a candidate by presenting a biased or parti-
san voting record. 3 7
In determining whether an organization has shown favoritism or
bias toward a particular candidate, the IRS again considers the man-
ner of presentation, the manner of distribution, and the timing of the
activity. Thus, when voter registration materials that an exempt or-
ganization mailed "contained language intended to induce conserva-
tive voters to register and vote in the 1984 General Election"138 and
were specifically "targeted to influence a segment of voters to vote for
President Reagan," 39 the organization demonstrated impermissible
bias. Similarly, when an organization's campaign-worker school adver-
tised for students that were "' [q]ualified, dedicated conservatives,' "14o
predominantly used Republican-based course materials, and almost
exclusively hired staff associated with the Republican Party,141 the or-
ganization revealed a "coordinated political agenda,"142 making it rea-
sonable to assume that the organization calculated its activities to
support particular candidates.
Despite the requirement of neutrality, however, the IRS has per-
mitted exempt organizations in some circumstances to take part in
political campaign activities in a partisan manner. Furthermore, even
some of the allegedly "neutral" activities have partisan effects. For ex-
ample, when the local Catholic church sends voting records that in-
clude the candidates' position on abortion to its membership, the
natural consequence of the mailing will be to favor those candidates
who ascribe to the Catholic Church's stance on abortion and to op-
pose those candidates who do not. Yet subject to some qualifications,
the church may distribute these voting records under current law
withoutjeopardizing its tax-exempt status. 143 Similarly, an exempt or-
ganization taking part in a voter registration drive may target a spe-
cific class of people such as minorities or young people even though it
is statistically more probable that these groups will vote for candidates
of a particular party.'4 Thus, further factors are necessary to explain
why the IRS and the courts permit these activities.
137 For an example of how strictly the IRS has enforced these restrictions, see General
Counsel Memorandum 39,811 (Feb. 9, 1990) (finding that a published questionnaire
describing the views of the candidates on abortion and homosexual rights and then urging
the recipients to "vote conscientiously" constituted implied electioneering).
138 Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-17-001 (Sept. 5, 1990).
139 Id.
140 Id. (quoting the registration materials).
141 See id&
142 Id.
143 See Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178; Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,444 (July 15, 1980).
144 See Milton Cerny, Advocacy Organizations-Litigation, Legislation, and Politics, C574
A.L.I.-A.BA. 97, 110 (1990).
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C. Whether the Activity Corresponds with the Organization's
Legitimate Exempt Purpose1 45
When an organization engages in activities relating to a political
campaign to further its exempt purposes, the courts and the IRS may
permit the activities because they support the desired social goals un-
derlying the exemption. 146 This result holds true even if the organiza-
tion participates in the activities in a partisan manner. In this way, the
courts and the IRS create an exception to § 501 (c) (3)'s absolute ban
and excuse conduct by exempt organizations that otherwise would
constitute political campaign activity. Thus, a tax-exempt university
will not lose its exemption for financial and advisory support of a stu-
dent newspaper even though the newspaper unequivocally endorses
particular candidates.147 Under normal circumstances, the IRS would
impute to the exempt organization the political activities of any organ-
ization that it funds.148 Because student newspaper activities are so
intertwined with the educational purposes of the university, however,
the IRS refuses to find a violation. For much the same reason, a tax-
exempt university will not lose its exemption for requiring students to
145 A legitimate exempt purpose is required to implicate this principle. Courts and
the IRS frequently deny exemption to organizations whose purposes are too intertwined
with or dependent upon political action for their realization. See Smith v. Commissioner, 3
T.C. 696 (1944) (finding an organization had no valid exempt educational purpose when
formed solely to obtain an amendment to the state constitution); Rev. Rul. 74-117, 1974-1
C.B. 128 (refusing exempt status to an organization "formed ... [to] implement[ ] an
orderly change of [state Governor's] administration" because the purpose of such an
organization too closely "correspond[s] with the partisan political interests of both the
Governor-elect and the political party he represents").
146 In some limited situations, the IRS permits an organization to engage in political
campaign activities that otherwise do not correspond with the organization's legitimate
exempt purpose. For example, an exempt organization may sell its membership mailing
lists to candidates under the same terms afforded to other purchasers if it then pays the
applicable unrelated business income tax. See Cerny, supra note 144, at 111. For simplic-
ity's sake, this discussion does not include this narrow circumstance.
147 See Rev. Rul. 72-513, 1972-2 C.B. 246. Revenue Ruling 72-513 states:
The publication and dissemination of the editorial statements... are
acts and expressions of opinion by students occurring in the course of bona
fide participation in academic programs and academic-related functions of
the educational institution. In such circumstances, the fact that the univer-
sity furnishes physical facilities and faculty advisors in connection with the
operation of the student newspaper does not make the expression of polit-
ical views by the students in the publishing of the newspaper the acts of the
university within the intendment of section 501 (c) (3) ....
Id. Revenue Ruling 72-513 also requires that a student newspaper be run in a customary
journalistic manner, that the students determine the editorial policy without the univer-
sity's intervention, and that the newspaper carry a statement identifying the editorial views
as those of the students rather than the university. See id.
148 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-12-001 (Aug. 21, 1996) (finding that an exempt organiza-




participate in a political campaign as part of a political science
course. 149
This factor also may permit an exempt organization to involve
itself directly in a campaign. In a Private Letter Ruling, a tax-exempt
mail-bundling organization that had formed to give employment op-
portunities to mentally disabled persons posed the question of
whether providing mailing services to political campaigns would vio-
late the proscription against political campaign activity.150 The IRS
concluded that this activity would not violate § 501 (c) (3) because it
merely would be incidental to the organization's charitable pur-
pose.151 Generally, if an exempt organization provides campaign
workers from its membership, it violates § 501 (c) (3).152 Here, the IRS
permitted the organization to provide services to a political campaign
simply because doing so furthered the exempt organization's purpose
of providing jobs for mentally disabled persons.
Fulani v. League of Women Voters Education Fund15 3 further demon-
strates the flexibility that courts are willing to grant exempt organiza-
tions to pursue their exempt purposes. In Fulani, an independent
and minor party candidate for President sued the League of Women
Voters for excluding her from televised primary debates for the Re-
publican and Democratic presidential nominations. 154 While noting
that "an organization's selective promotion of certain parties over
others would be inconsistent with its § 501 (c) (3) tax-exempt status,"
the court emphasized that the "function [of primary contests] in our
current electoral system [is] separate and distinct" and held that the
exclusion of an independent candidate from primary debates did not
constitute proscribed political activity.155 Thus, because the League's
sponsorship of the primary debates coincided with the organization's
exempt purpose of "help[ing] voters and supporters make an in-
formed choice when time came to vote in the Republican and Demo-
cratic primary contests,"' 56 the court overlooked both the partisan
exclusion of independent candidates from primary debates that its de-
cision necessitated and the possible inconsistency of this position with
the organization's broader goal of voter education.
149 See Rev. Rul. 72-512, 1972-2 C.B. 246. To ensure compliance with § 501(c) (3)'s
restrictions, universities only should offer courses requiring involvement with a political
campaign as electives and permit the students to choose the candidate for whom they wish
to work. See Baird, supra note 14, at 144.
150 See Priv. Ltr. RUl. 91-52-039 (Sept. 30, 1991).
151 See id.
152 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-17-001 (Sept. 5, 1990).
153 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989).
154 See id. at 623.




Fulani, therefore, stands for three significant propositions. First,
Fulani reveals that an organization's legitimate exempt purpose may
operate with such force that it justifies, in some circumstances, parti-
san political activity with a high probability of favoring and disfavoring
particular candidates. The court permitted the exclusion of Fulani
from the nationally televised debates even though the exclusion unde-
niably gave Republican and Democratic primary candidates greater
publicity and thus a decided advantage in the overall election. Sec-
ond, Fulani suggests that an exempt organization's choice of which
activities to undertake in pursuit of its legitimate exempt purposes is
entitled to a measure of deference. The court affirmed the League's
conclusion that the importance of educating voters about the candi-
dates in a partisan primary election justified significant expenditures
even though this choice necessarily reduced the funds available to ed-
ucate voters about the positions of independent candidates for the
same office in the general election.
Third, Fulani indicates the court's recognition that practical limi-
tations sometimes require an exempt organization to make decisions
that adversely affect a particular candidate to fulfill its exempt pur-
pose. The court noted that "approximately 280 individuals had filed
statements with the Federal Election Commission... indicating that
they considered themselves to be candidates for the office of Presi-
dent. 15 7 Because the inclusion of all 280 candidates in each debate
would not only present a logistic impossibility but also frustrate the
purpose of voter education, the court implicitly adopted the position
that the exempt organization may use "non-partisan criteria" in assess-
ing the "'significance' of an individual's candidacy."158
The analysis thus far has shown that the IRS broadly defines polit-
ical campaign activity to include activities that either result in financial
or volunteer assistance to a candidate's campaign or influence voter
opinion. Exempt organizations may engage in political campaign ac-
tivities, however, whenever it is possible to do so in a neutral manner.
157 Id. at 625.
158 Id. The IRS acknowledged this fact in Technical Advice Memorandum 96-35-003
(Apr. 19, 1995), stating that "where the number of legally qualified candidates for a partic-
ular office is large, a sponsoring organization... might determine that holding a debate to
which all legally qualified candidates were invited would be impractical and deter from the
educational purposes of the organization." The IRS went on to identify four factors to be
considered:
(1) Whether inviting all legally qualified candidates is impractical;
(2) Whether the organization adopted reasonable, objective criteria for de-
termining which candidate to invite;
(3) Whether the criteria were applied consistently and non-arbitrarily to all
candidates; and




Furthermore, exempt organizations sometimes may engage in these
activities in a partisan manner when doing so is necessary as a practi-
cal matter to further the organization's legitimate exempt purposes.
This scheme, however, still contains some rough edges. The potential
for harsh results calls for equitable considerations.
D. Whether Mitigating Circumstances Exist that Call for the
Exercise of Leniency
The last factor involved in § 501 (c) (3) political campaign activity
analysis focuses upon mitigating circumstances that call for the exer-
cise of leniency. Unfortunately, the IRS has been somewhat inconsis-
tent in its consideration of mitigating circumstances. On the one
hand, IRS materials identify § 501 (c) (3)'s prohibition as an "absolute
prohibition"' 59 that "does not permit a de minimis amount of political
intervention."160 On the other hand, numerous IRS materials refer to
a de minimis standard that may permit "something less than an 'in-
substantial' amount of political activity."'161 The passage of § 4955's
excise tax on political expenditures as an alternative remedy to revoca-
tion for § 501 (c) (3) political campaign activity violations assures, how-
ever, that the IRS will consider mitigating circumstances, even if only
as a remedial matter.162 As the IRS itself puts it, "[T]here may be
individual cases where ... the IRS may exercise its discretion to im-
pose a tax under section 4955 but not to seek revocation of the organi-
zation's tax-exempt status."'1 63
The IRS appears to consider four mitigating circumstances in-
portant in deciding whether to seek revocation of an organization's
tax-exempt status. First, the IRS will consider the nature of the partic-
ular activity in question. When a political activity is "of [a] trifling
nature" or otherwise insubstantial in relation to the organization's
other activities, the IRS may not revoke the organization's exempt sta-
tus as a matter of equity.'6 The IRS sometimes refers to this factor as
159 INTmaI. REVENUE SERV., supra note 9, § 3(10)1.
160 Political Expenditures by Section 501(c) (3) Organizations, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,209,
62,209 (1995) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 53, 301) (explaining that the § 4955
excise tax is also subject to this § 501 (c) (3) "substantive standard[ ]i).
161 Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,682 (Nov. 9, 1967).
162 See I.R.C. § 4955 (1994). With § 4955, Congress attempted to reduce the harsh
outcomes resulting from the absolute prohibition against political activity by imposing an
excise tax on taxable expenditures as an alternative to revocation. This scheme, however,
cannot completely replace a de minimis or insubstantiality analysis, for just as the revoca-
tion penalty may be too harsh, this penalty may be too lenient. Because many exempt
organizations' political activities will not involve political expenditures that may be subject
to an excise tax, the IRS will be forced once again either to revoke the organization's tax-
exempt status or to ignore its political activity as insubstantial.
163 Political Expenditures by Section 501(c) (3) Organizations, 60 Fed. Reg. at 62,209.
164 Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,682 (Nov. 9, 1967).
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the "de minimis" standard, 165 which is "decided case by case"1 66 based
on "all the surrounding circumstances.' 1 67 In an internal memoran-
dum, for example, the IRS considered an exempt organization's 1960
publication that suggested that the election of a "non-independent
Catholic" would endanger the separation of church and state. 16 Even
though the statement implied bias against the candidacy of John F.
Kennedy, the IRS elected not to revoke the organization's tax-exempt
status for "a mere espousal of the view" and looked to the relative
overall importance of the statement to the organization in determin-
ing the appropriateness of imposing sanctions. 169 Thus, the trivial na-
ture of a particular proscribed campaign activity or its existence as an
anomaly in relation to the organization's other activities may serve an
important mitigating function in borderline cases.
Second, the IRS may consider whether participation in a pro-
scribed political campaign activity is widespread among exempt orga-
nizations. By considering the prevalence of a particular activity, the
IRS both avoids unduly penalizing one organization for what might be
a profession-wide misunderstanding of the rules and manages to avoid
allegations of selective prosecution. Thus, the IRS has explained:
We are not indicating that the de minimis principle can or
should be invoked in every case where a number of organizations
have engaged in substantially similar activities. However, we do
think that in a case where it is questionable whether more than a de
minimis amount of political activity has taken place, and where to
revoke an exemption would give the appearance of dissimilar treat-
ment of organizations similarly situated, the principle should be
invoked. 170
165 Id.; see also Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,441 (Sept. 27, 1985) (defining de minimis as "so
trivial as to be without legal significance"); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,414 (Sept. 25, 1985)
(describing de minimis as "something less than an 'insubstantial' amount of political
activity").
166 Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,414 (Sept. 25, 1985). In support of its determination that a
particular organization has engaged in proscribed political activity, the IRS may expressly
compare the activity in question to the de minimis "triviality" standard. See id. ("We con-
clude based on the facts and circumstances of the case that the [organization]'s political
activity is of such an extensive and continuing nature that it far exceeds the de minimis
standard applicable to political activity.").
167 Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,267 (Feb. 20, 1970).
168 Id.
169 Id. The IRS stated:
There likewise appears to be no room for doubt that the Service is also
logically obliged to give due consideration to all the other publishing and
nonpublishing activities of the subject organization in connection with any
attempt to determine how much or how little relative importance can prop-





Third, the IRS may consider the likelihood of further political
activity by the organization in question. When an organization "subse-
quently adopts procedures to assure no [prohibited expenditures oc-
cur in the] future," IRS materials suggest that the organization may
escape revocation of its tax-exempt status. 171 In many regards, this
factor mimics the de minimis question of whether the particular activ-
ity is an anomaly in relation to the organization's other activities. By
swiftly implementing measures designed to prevent any further polit-
ical campaign participation, an exempt organization demonstrates
that it will not continue the prohibited activity as a regular part of its
operations. These measures provide the IRS with a rational basis for
determining that the proscribed conduct is either a fluke or the act of
a loose cannon within the organization.
Fourth, the IRS may consider as a mitigating circumstance
whether the conduct resulted from deeply-held religious beliefs.' 72
Some commentators have criticized the IRS's consideration of this fac-
tor as "unworkable" because it requires the IRS "to determine which
actions are 'religiously' motivated or which 'convictions' are 'deeply
held."' ,7U The factor may be justified, however, as another reflection
of the concern that the IRS should not punish an otherwise legitimate
exempt organization for a one-time, deeply motivated involvement in
political campaign activity. Consideration of deeply held religious be-
liefs also may be justified when the line between the political and reli-
gious activity is especially fuzzy. As one court has noted:
[A] sermon on the holiness of the Sabbath Day may legitimately
include an exhortation to the congregation or church group to ob-
serve and preserve the sanctity of the Sabbath. It would not be any
less religious, or, for that matter, any more political, if the exhorta-
.tion included expressions of approval of Sunday observance laws. 174
Thus, the IRS may consider religious motivation as a means of avoid-
ing contentious First Amendment disputes when an organization has
undertaken only a limited amount of political activity and, presuma-
bly, would be unlikely to become politically involved in the future.
171 Political Expenditures by Section 501(c) (3) Organizations, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,359,
64,360 (1994) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 53, 301); see also Political Expenditures by
Section 501(c) (3) Organizations, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,209, 62,209 (1995) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pts. 1, 53, 301) (explaining that an organization may avoid revocation when the
organization takes "measures... to prevent a recurrence").
172 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,071 (Mar. 11, 1969) ("It may wel be that political inter-
vention inspired by deeply-held religious convictions furnishes a prime example of a situa-
tion calling for application of the de minimis rule ...
173 Sabbath, supra note 82, at 862-63.
174 Lord's Day Alliance v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 62, 65 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Although
the Lord's Day Alliance court addressed § 501 (c) (3)'s prohibition against attempts to influ-





CRITICISMS, OBSERVATIONS, AND A PROPOSITION
Part II outlined four factors that shape the analysis the courts and
the IRS employ under the existing facts and circumstances test. This
Part broadens the scope of the inquiry in an attempt to accomplish
three distinct goals. First, this Part identifies the weaknesses that char-
acterize the existing facts and circumstances test. Second, this Part
highlights an inherent tension within § 501 (c) (3) that exacerbates the
uncertainty flowing from the existing test. Finally, this Part proposes a
test that attempts to resolve the problems raised by the existing test
and the statute's inherent tension.
A. Problems with the Existing Approach
1. Undue Flexibility
By failing to provide IRS decision makers with enough meaning-
ful guidance to prevent them from concocting their own idiosyncratic
definitions of political campaign activity, the existing facts and circum-
stances test proves much too flexible. As a result, the existing test
exacerbates two of the most pressing problems facing § 501 (c) (3) ju-
risprudence. First, by granting IRS decision makers seemingly un-
checked discretion, the existing test invites the consideration of
invidious factors. 175 The existing test's flexibility enables IRS decision
makers to mercilessly pursue exempt organizations with disfavored
political or religious affiliations while allowing favored exempt organi-
zations to slip through the doctrinal net.
Second, the existing test's undue flexibility erects an almost insur-
mountable hurdle to clarity and consistency. Without guidance con-
cerning which facts and circumstances to consider, IRS decision
makers have reached contrary results in nearly identical situations.
Consider, for example, IRS materials dealing with issue advocacy. In
one memorandum, the IRS considered an exempt organization that
had run television advertisements in twelve large media markets
around the time of a key Reagan/Mondale debate encouraging the
listener to vote to avoid nuclear proliferation. 76 The organization's
purpose for running these advertisements was to "educate the citizens
about peace and arms control issues by injecting these issues into Con-
gressional and Presidential races." 177 Despite the timing of the adver-
tisements and their clear support for Mondale's position on defense,
175 See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider & Margaret F. Brinig, AN INvrrATION To FAMiLY LAw 791-
92 (1996) ("The most prominent drawback [of discretion] ... is that it makes it easier than
rules usually do for a decision-maker to employ illegitimate considerations.").




the IRS found that the organization had not engaged in political cam-
paign activity.178 A recent Private Letter Ruling, however, reached the
opposite conclusion under similar circumstances. 79 In this Ruling,
the IRS addressed an exempt organization's "public education pro-
gram to raise public consciousness about the importance of social and
economic values that it favors."' 80 The organization selected "certain
issues based on their importance to the Fund's agenda and their ex-
pected resonance with the public in present and future political cam-
paigns, for special emphasis in the Fund's voter education
program.' 1 Here, the IRS found that the organization's proposed
distribution of educational materials would constitute prohibited
political campaign activity.182 Without a more clearly defined test, ex-
empt organizations only can guess at what "facts and circumstances"
distinguish these two decisions.
Section 501 (c) (3) jurisprudence cannot tolerate this lack of clar-
ity and consistency for several reasons. First, the penalty of exempt-
status revocation for engaging in political activity effectively could
spell financial doom for the exempt organization.'83 At best, the revo-
cation would result in the organization incurring a substantial tax lia-
bility. At worst, contributors would withdraw their support in favor of
a similar organization that could offer them a personal tax deduc-
tion.'8 4 Second, the prohibition of political campaign activity is abso-
lute.'18 5 Consequently, the IRS requires only a single misstep by the
organization to justify revocation. Third, the prohibition applies to a
course of conduct-political campaign activity-that is inherently am-
biguous. The line between political activities and educational or reli-
gious activities is already a blurry one. Fourth, the prohibition
involves fundamental First Amendment freedoms.'8 6 A vague defini-
tion of political campaign activity chills an exempt organization's le-
gitimate exercise of its First Amendment freedoms. Finally, because
exempt organizations may win or lose important policy battles affect-
ing them and their goals with the outcome of political campaigns,
they have a tremendous incentive to become involved in elections.
Thus, a vague definition of proscribed political activity frustrates an
178 See id,




183 When the IRS revokes an organization's § 501(c) (3) tax-exempt status for partici-
pation in political campaign activity, the organization may not simply shift to a § 501 (c) (4)
social welfare organization to retain its tax-exempt status. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (4) (a) (1994).
184 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
185 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
186 See supra Part I.B.1.
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exempt organization seeking to further its cause to the greatest extent
possible in the political realm.
2. Perverse Incentives
In addition to problems of flexibility, the uncertainty surround-
ing the existing test creates perverse incentives for aggressive exempt
organizations to violate the prohibition. These perverse incentives oc-
cur because "[f]acts and circumstances tests tend to penalize those
who are faint of heart while rewarding the daring."'187 To understand
why these incentives are created, imagine that because of the uncer-
tainty in applying a test based on all the facts and circumstances, the
probability that an organization would be sanctioned for its political
involvement ranges from a chance of never being caught to a chance
of always being caught. Reacting to this uncertainty, risk-averse ex-
empt organizations would guard against the worst-case scenario and
thereby refrain from engaging in political activity. Aggressive exempt
organizations, on the other hand, more likely would believe that the
IRS will not catch them and thereby would engage in political cam-
paign activity. Thus, because the decision to participate in a political
campaign implicates an organization's assessment and tolerance of
risk, the uncertainty surrounding the existing test encourages aggres-
sive exempt organizations to push the spirit of § 501 (c) (3)'s prohibi-
tion, while prompting more risk-averse organizations to play it
safely.188
The nature of § 501 (c) (3)'s prohibition creates an additional in-
centive for aggressive risk-taking organizations to engage in political
campaign activity. Because the prohibition serves to silence risk-
averse organizations by keeping them out of the political debate, the
political viewpoints of the aggressive exempt organization enter the
marketplace of ideas without competition. Thus, the uncertainty in
the existing test encourages aggressive exempt organizations to violate
the prohibition and then rewards these law-breaking organizations by
increasing the effectiveness of their political speech. As a result, the
facts and circumstances test gives those organizations that would be
the most likely to violate the prohibition another reason to do so
while doubly penalizing those organizations that adhere to the letter
of the law.
187 RichardJ. Kovach, Bright Lines, Facts and Circumstances Tests, and Complexity in Federal
Taxation, 46 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1287, 1312 (1996).
188 Cf id. at 1313 (explaining that aggressive players come out ahead in a tax system
that uses a facts and circumstances test by noting, for example, that "aggressive taxpayers
will exploit the implications of the limited audit resources and a relatively short period of
limitations on tax assessments"). Professor Kovach goes on to suggest that "policy makers
... might well consider the direct and honest.., approach" instead of the existing facts




The existing test's imprecision also breeds doctrinal confusion.
By opening the scope of the inquiry to all the surrounding facts and
circumstances, the existing test encourages the IRS to stray from the
plain language of the statute. As several commentators note, "The
primary deficiency of the [existing] IRS approach is that it appears to
have ignored the words 'on behalf of a candidate' . . . [and to have
made a] subtle shift to the concept of 'influencing the outcome of an
election.'"189 Some IRS materials demonstrate even more egregious
analytic confusion. One publication, for example, asserts that the pro-
hibition encompasses "any... activities that may be beneficial or det-
rimental to any candidate."'9 0 Certainly, participation in a political
campaign on behalf of a candidate is conceptually distinct from those
activities that prove beneficial or detrimental to a candidate. Indeed,
the IRS specifically has approved participation by exempt organiza-
tions in a number of activities that are all but certain to benefit or
harm a candidate.'91
B. Problems with the Statutory Structure
The existing facts and circumstances test does not provide the
only source for the confusion in § 501 (c) (3) jurisprudence. The stat-
ute itself struggles with an inherent tension. On the one hand, tax
exemptions subsidize' 92 the work of organizations that contribute to
the well-being of society and thereby reduce the strain upon govern-
ment resources.' 93 Thus, § 501 (c) (3) represents a conscious choice
by Congress to support the very broad category of organizations that
operate "for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes."'194  On the other hand,
§ 501 (c) (3)'s prohibition of political campaign activity seeks to keep
the U.S. Treasury "neutral in political affairs." 195
189 Caron & Dessingue, supra note 19, at 198.
190 I.R.S. News Release IR-96-23 (Apr. 24, 1996).
191 See supra text accompanying notes 132-37.
192 See United States v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545-46 (1983).
193 See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924); H.R. REP.
No. 75-1860, pt. 2, at 18 (1938); HoPKiNs, supra note 19, §§ 1.1-1.2; Stephen Schwarz, Limit-
ing Religious Tax Exemptions: Wien Should the Church Render unto Caesar, 29 U. FLA. L. REv.
50, 55 (1976). Whether this rationale can support the exemption of religious organiza-
tions is subject to dispute. Compare id. at 55-56 (arguing that a "broader secular purpose"
of contributing to a pluralistic society avoids these difficulties), with Laura B. Chisolm,
Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201, 265-66
(1987) (arguing that this justification cannot apply to religious organizations because of
the constitutional limitation on the government "from engaging in or directly supporting
religious activity").
194 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
195 H.R. REP. No. 100-391, pt. 2, at 1625 (1987).
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Yet the goals of furthering the work of exempt organizations and
of keeping the Treasury neutral sit at cross-purposes when the exempt
organization is inextricably linked to the political scene. For example,
if the League of Women Voters is going to accomplish its goal of
"help [ing] voters and supporters make an informed choice when the
time [comes] to vote in the Republican and Democratic primary con-
tests,"' 96 then it must become involved in political campaigns. Fur-
thermore, because the outcome of elections frequently hinges on
both voter turnout and voter understanding of the candidates and the
issues, voter education activities never will be completely neutral. Is-
sue-oriented groups raise a similar problem. The educational activi-
ties of exempt organizations such as National Right to Life and
Planned Parenthood almost certainly will coincide with political cam-
paigns in which these issues are hotly contested. In addition, the pro-
motion and advocacy of these issues necessarily translates into
tangible support for candidates with favorable positions on these is-
sues by building and sustaining a voter base to which this issue is im-
portant. Thus, for the government to realize the contributions to
society's well-being rendered by exempt organizations, it must depart
from absolute neutrality.
This tension between purposes within § 501 (c) (3) may explain
the nervousness some courts and the IRS have expressed at interfer-
ing unduly with an exempt organization's pursuit of its exempt pur-
poses. Thus, the discretion that the Fulani court afforded the League
of Women Voters in structuring its voter education activities may re-
flect the court's concern that a strict reading of § 501 (c) (3) 's prohibi-
tion of political campaign activity would frustrate the League's
educational efforts. A similar motivation may have prompted the IRS
to allow exempt organizations to indicate on some voter education
materials whether the candidate supports or opposes the organiza-
tion's position.197 The courts and the IRS, however, cannot ade-
quately address the tension between maintaining government
neutrality and furthering the work of exempt organizations by al-
lowing the tension to linger beneath the surface of their decisions.
The standard must attempt to strike a balance that allows exempt or-
ganizations to be involved in the political sphere when necessary to
accomplish their exempt purposes but that prevents them from be-
coming pseudo-political action committees.
196 Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 629 (2d Cir. 1989).
'97 See Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178.
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C. A Proposed Test
1. The Test
Thus far, Part 1H of this Note has highlighted some of the
problems with the existing IRS test and the statutory structure. This
section now proposes a two-part test that both addresses the need for
clarity and attempts to resolve the inherent tension between maintain-
ing government neutrality and furthering the work of exempt organi-
zations. In an effort to remain consistent with the statutory authority
and existing precedent, the test consciously incorporates some aspects
of the existing modes of analysis as described in Part II. The test de-
parts from this analysis, however, when necessary to increase the clar-
ity and consistency of § 501(c) (3) jurisprudence and to remove
unreasonable obstacles to the pursuit of legitimate charitable
functions.
The first part of the proposed test establishes the following pre-
sumption: an exempt organization will not violate § 501 (c) (3)'s prohi-
bition against political campaign activity when it engages in activities
that have the potential to influence voter opinion as long as it con-
ducts the activities in as neutral and nonpartisan a manner as is practi-
cable under the circumstances. 198 As a result, the first part of the test
establishes a safe harbor. An exempt organization need only demon-
strate that it acted in a neutral manner to escape the prohibition. A
court or the IRS would determine neutrality, for purposes of the pre-
sumption, by reference to the following three factors: the manner of
presentation, the manner of distribution, and the timing of the
activity.
The inquiry into the manner of presentation focuses on the na-
ture of the activity and the content and reasonable implications of any
distributed materials in determining whether the organization showed
favoritism or bias. Partisan political identifications or phrasing that
strongly imply support or opposition to a particular candidate would
indicate a lack of neutrality, whereas objective reporting and equal
treatment of the candidates would suggest impartiality. By contrast,
the manner of distribution focuses not on the activity itself but on how
the organization undertook the activity. Evidence that an organiza-
tion targeted an activity or distribution to a particular geographic
area, for example, may show a deliberate attempt to support or op-
pose a particular candidate, whereas general availability or limited dis-
198 For simplicity's sake, the presumption excludes situations in which the exempt or-
ganization provides financial or volunteer aid to a campaign. These activities, by their very
nature, inherently support a candidate's campaign, see supra text accompanying notes 121-
31, and absent unusual circumstances, an exempt organization could never provide finan-
cial or volunteer aid to a campaign in a neutral manner so as to enjoy the presumption, see
supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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tribution to established membership may suggest neutrality. Finally,
the timing of the activity may indicate partisan bias. Although many
types of voter education activities can occur only during a campaign,
timing an activity to maximize support for a particular candidate may
reveal an organization's partiality.
The first part of the test, however, does not require absolute neu-
trality. An organization need only demonstrate as much neutrality as
is practicable under the circumstances. This language addresses situa-
tions such as that raised by Fulani in which the sheer number of candi-
dates makes equal treatment of every candidate impossible. Thus, an
organization may make decisions that adversely affect particular can-
didates when the circumstances so demand. When an exempt organi-
zation can treat the candidates equally, however, an organization must
make every effort to retain neutrality to enjoy the presumption.
The second part of the test offers another chance to avoid sanc-
tion to those organizations that cannot show the neutrality required to
satisfy the first part's presumption. The second part provides as fol-
lows: an exempt organization may engage in activities that provide fi-
nancial or volunteer assistance or that have the potential to influence
voter opinion as long as the expression of favoritism for the candidate
is peripheral to the furtherance of the organization's legitimate ex-
empt function. In this way, the second part of the test creates an ex-
ception for situations in which an exempt organization's pursuit of its
legitimate exempt purposes overwhelms its political involvement. In
these situations, the activity is more charitable than political. For ex-
ample, when individuals form a tax-exempt mail-bundling organiza-
tion to give employment opportunities to mentally disabled persons,
and it provides mailing services for political campaigns, 99 it escapes
violating the prohibition under the second part of the test. The or-
ganization's desire to further its exempt purposes by providing em-
ployment opportunities for the mentally handicapped so outstrips its
political involvement as to render the involvement inconsequential.
The tax-exempt financing for the college courses that Newt Ging-
rich taught further illustrates the second part of the test. In 1993 and
1994, the former Speaker of the House taught a televised college
course entitled "Renewing American Civilization" at two small colleges
in Georgia.200 These courses were funded in part by tax deductible
contributions from two private, nonprofit foundations. 20 1 This ar-
rangement would pass the second part of the proposed test because
any support for Gingrich's campaign was secondary to the organiza-
199 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-52-039 (Sept. 30, 1991).





tion's attainment of its educational goals. As a former history profes-
sor, Speaker of the House, and leader of the Republican Revolution,
Gingrich was certainly well-qualified to teach a course on "Renewing
American Civilization." In fact, Gingrich's courses gave these colleges
the opportunity to offer their students a unique and probably unfor-
gettable educational experience. Thus, under the second part of the
test, the colleges may offer these courses because any advancement of
Gingrich's candidacy was peripheral to the courses' educational
opportunities. 202
2. Advantages of the Test
The proposed test offers several advantages over the existing facts
and circumstances inquiry. First, by establishing a presumption that
political campaign activities undertaken in a neutral fashion do not
violate the prohibition, the proposed test helps to resolve the uncer-
tainty surrounding the application of § 501 (c) (3). Under the test, ex-
empt organizations that wish to engage in activitiqs that have the
potential to influence voter opinion need not worry about the idiosyn-
crasies of IRS decision makers because they can ensure compliance
merely by taking steps from the outset to create a record of their neu-
trality. In this way, the proposed test removes the perverse incentives
that the existing facts and circumstances test creates by freeing risk-
averse organizations to engage in identifiable political activities with-
out the fear of having their tax-exempt status revoked.20 3 The pre-
sumption also decreases the risk that IRS decision makers will
consider invidious factors by constraining their discretion. Under the
proposed tests, IRS decision makers only need to consider (1)
whether an activity has the potential to influence voter opinion and
(2) if so, whether the organization has conducted the activity in a neu-
tral fashion. The proposed test constrains discretion even further by
identifying the manner of presentation, the manner of distribution,
and the timing of the activity as relevant factors. Thus, the proposed
test provides a principled basis for enforcement and thereby helps to
avoid selective prosecution problems. Finally, by focusing upon an
exempt organization's neutrality, the proposed test directs the inquiry
back toward the statutory language. Section 501 (c) (3) does not pro-
hibit all political campaign activities but only those that an exempt
organization undertakes "on behalf of (or in opposition to) a candi-
date for public office."204 This renewed focus upon the statutory lan-
guage ensures that doctrinal mischief will be minimized.
202 Cf id. (noting that the attorney for one of the colleges had obtained a letter from
the IRS approving the courses).
203 See supra Part III.A.2.
204 I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) (1994).
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Second, the proposed test strikes a workable balance between
maintaining government neutrality and fostering the work of exempt
organizations. The first part of the test gives exempt organizations an
incentive to strive for neutrality when engaging in political campaign
activities so they may enjoy the benefits of the safe harbor presump-
tion. The second part of the test then creates a limited exception,
allowing exempt organizations to participate in a partisan political
campaign activity when that partisan activity is secondary to furthering
their legitimate exempt interests. As a result, exempt organizations
have incentives to deviate from neutrality only when such a departure
would facilitate the attainment of their socially beneficial goals.
CONCLUSION
Section 501 (c) (3) 's prohibition of political campaign activity rep-
resents a serious limitation on the First Amendment liberties of tax-
exempt organizations. By continuing to characterize this imposition
upon free speech and religious exercise with oracular pronounce-
ments, vague standards, and haphazard enforcement practices, the
courts and the IRS have created tremendous uncertainty when clear
guidance is needed. The existing facts and circumstances test must be
replaced with a scheme that better reflects the realities of § 501 (c) (3)
jurisprudence, its underlying purposes, and its statutory mandate.
Until the courts and the IRS establish rational and understandable
boundaries to § 501 (c) (3)'s prohibition, they will continue to stifle
the valuable contributions of exempt organizations to the market-
place of political and moral ideas and to discourage the uninhibited
pursuit of their beneficial exempt purposes.
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